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Abstract
We study the time change of the relation between the
rank of a racehorse in the Japan Racing Association
and the result of victory or defeat. Horses are ranked
according to the win bet fractions. As the vote pro-
gresses, the racehorses are mixed on the win bet frac-
tion axis. We see the emergence of a scale invariant
relation between the cumulative distribution function
of the winning horse x1 and that of the losing horse x0.
x1 ∝ x
α
0 holds in the small win bet fraction region. We
also see the efficiency of the market as the vote pro-
ceeds. However, the convergence to the efficient state
is not monotonic. The time change of the distribution
of a vote is complicated. Votes resume concentration
on popular horses, after the distribution spreads to a
certain extent. In order to explain scale invariance, we
introduce a simple voting model. In a ‘double’ scaling
limit, we show that the exact scale invariance relation
x1 = x
α
0 holds over the entire range 0 ≤ x0, x1 ≤ 1.
1 Introduction
Racetrack betting is a simple exercise of gaining a profit
or losing one’s wager. However, one needs to make a
decision in the face of uncertainty and a closer inspec-
tion reveals great complexity and scope. The field has
attracted many academics from a wide variety of dis-
ciplines and has become a subject of wider importance
[1]. Compared to the stock or currency exchange mar-
kets, racetrack betting is a short-lived and repeated
market. It is possible to obtain starker views of aggre-
gated better behaviour and study the market efficiency.
One of the main findings of the previous studies is the
‘favorite-longshot bias’ in the racetrack betting market
[2, 3]. Final odds are, on average, accurate measures
of winning and short-odds horses are systematically
undervalued and long-odds horses are systematically
overvalued.
From an econophysical viewpoint, racetrack betting
is an interesting subject. Park and Dommany have
done an analysis of the distribution of final odds (div-
idends) of the races organized by the Korean Racing
Association [4]. They found power law behaviour in
the distribution and proposed a simple betting model.
Ichinomiya also found the power law in the races of
the Japan Racing Association (JRA) [5] and proposed
another betting model. We have studied the relation
between the rank of a racehorse in JRA and the result
of victory or defeat [6]. Horses are ranked according
to the win bet fractions. We studied the distribution
of the winning horses in the long-odds region [6]. Be-
tween the cumulative distribution function of the win-
ning horses x1 and that of the losing horses x0, we find
a scale invariant relation x1 ∝ x
α
0 with α = 1.81. We
show that in a ‘Po´lya’ like betting model, where bet-
ters vote on the horses according to the probabilities
that are proportional to the votes, such a scale invari-
ance emerges in a self-organized fashion. Furthermore,
the exact scale invariant relation x1 = x
α
0 holds ex-
actly over the entire range 0 ≤ x0, x1 ≤ 1 in a limit.
We also studied a voting model with two kinds of vot-
ers, independent and copycat [7]. We find that a phase
transition occurs in the process of information cascade
and it causes a critical slowing down in the convergence
of the decision making of crowds.
In this paper, we study the time series data of the
votein JRA races in detail. We show that as the vote
progresses, scale invariance and market efficiency do
emerge in the rank of the racehorses. The decision
making process in betting is not simple and some subtle
mechanism does work. We explain the scale invariance
based on a simple betting model.
2 Racetrack betting process
We study the win bet data of JRA races in 2008. A
win bet requires one to name the winner of the race.
There are 3542 races and we choose 3250 races whose
final public win pool (total number of votes) Vr is in
the range 105 ≤ Vr ≤ 10
6, r ∈ {1, 2, · · · , R = 3250}.
Hr horses run in race r and 7 ≤ Hr ≤ 18. We remove
133 cancelled horses and the total number of horses
N ≡
∑R
r=1Hr is 47273. There are 3251 winning horses
(one tie occurs) and are denoted as N1 = 3251. Of
course, the remaining 44022 horses are losers and are
denoted as N0 = N − N1. The number of times race
r is announced is denoted as Kr and is in the range
13 ≤ Kr ≤ 262. The total number of announcements
is K ≡
∑R
r=1Kr = 285269. The time to the race entry
time (start of the race) in minutes is denoted as T rk . We
denote the odds of the ith horse in race r at the kth
announcement as Ori,k and the public win pool as V
r
k .
Iri denotes the results of the races. I
r
i = 1(0) implies
that the horse wins (loses). A typical sample from the
data is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Time Series of odds and pool for a race that
starts at 13 : 00. Hr = 10,Kr = 52 and we show the
data only for the first three horses 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. The first
horse wins in the race (Ir1 = 1, I
r
2 = I
r
3 = 0).
k T rk [min] V
r
k O
r
1,k O
r
2,k O
r
3,k · · ·
1 358 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 · · ·
2 351 169 1.6 33.3 7.9 · · ·
3 343 314 1.8 11.3 8.0 · · ·
4 336 812 2.9 17.8 14.6 · · ·
5 329 1400 3.3 8.6 10.6 · · ·
6 322 1587 2.7 9.2 11.3 · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
51 10 80064 2.4 6.4 13.4 · · ·
52 4 148289 2.4 4.9 16.1 · · ·
53 -2 211653 2.4 5.3 17.0 · · ·
From Ori,k, we estimate the win bet fraction x
r
i,k by
the following relation.
xri,k =
0.788
Ori,k − 0.1
. (1)
If the above does not sum up to one, we renormalize it
as xˆri,k =
xri,k∑
Hr
i=1
xr
i,k
. Hereafter, we use xri,k in place of
xˆri,k [8].
We use the average public win pool as a time variable
t of the whole betting process. For each v, we choose
the nearest V ri,k and use the average value of V
r
i,k as the
time variable t. More explicitly, we define t as
t(v) ≡
1
R
R∑
r=1
V rkr(v), (2)
kr(v) ≡ {k | Mink|V
r
k − v|}. (3)
We define xri (t) and T
r(t) as
xri (t) ≡ x
r
i,kr(v) (4)
T r(t) ≡ T rkr(v). (5)
We denote the average value of T r(t) as T (t) and it is
defined as
T (t) ≡
1
R
R∑
r=1
T rkr(v). (6)
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Figure 1: Relation between average time to start T and
average number of votes t.
Figure 1 shows the relation between T and t. We see
a rapid growth of the average number of votes t as we
approach the start of the race (T → 0). Almost half
of the votes are thrown in the last ten minutes. We
choose five timings from the voting process and denote
them as tj , j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. t0 corresponds to the first
voting data k = 1 in each race. t0 ≃ 70.4 and T (t0) ≃
620.6[min]. At t1 ≃ 2342.9, T (t1) ≃ 440.2[min]. At
t2 ≃ 15482.0, T (t2) ≃ 167.6[min] and at t3 ≃ 195201.3,
T (t3) ≃ 2.5[min]. t4 corresponds to the last voting
data k = Kr in each race. t4 ≃ 249708.8 and T (t4) ≃
−1.1[min]. All data are summarized after the start of
race. The reason why we choose ti, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} will
become clear in section 4.
In order to see the betting process pictorially, we
arrange the N horses in the order of the size of xri (t).
We denote the arranged win bet fraction as xα(t), α ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}.
x1(t) ≥ x2(t) ≥ x3(t) ≥ · · · ≥ xN (t) (7)
Iα(t) tells us whether horse α wins (Iα = 1) or loses
(Iα = 0). In general, the probability that the horse
with large xα(t) wins is big and vice versa. We ar-
range the horses in the increasing in order of α from left
to right. On the left-hand side of the sequence, more
strong horses exist. On the right-hand side, there are
more weak horses. If the win bet fraction does not con-
tain any information about the strength of the horses,
Iα(t) is one and zero randomly. Conversely, if the in-
formation is perfectly correct, the first N1 horses’ Iα(t)
are 1 and the remaining N0 horses’ Iα(t) are 0.
Figure 2: Pictorial presentation of the betting process.
We choose 100 winning (red) and 100 losing (blue)
horses randomly and follow their ranking as the betting
proceeds. One losing horse is tagged by yellow dots.
Figure 2 shows the time change of the ranking pro-
cess of the horses. We choose 100 horses for each cate-
gory Iα = {1, 0} and follow their ranking as the betting
proceeds. We use ∆v = 2000 as the time step. Dur-
ing one hundred steps, the average number of votes t
changes from t0 for v = 0 (bottom) to about 178116
for v = 200000 (top). v = 0 corresponds to the first
announcement r = 1 and t = t0. At t0, the horses
are arranged in the sequence at random. The win bet
fractions xα(t0) do not contain much information about
the strength of the horses. As the betting progresses,
the phase separation between the two categories of the
horses does occur. Winning (losing) horses move to the
left (right) in general. In the end, to the left (right) are
more winning (losing) horses. In the betting process,
betters have succeeded in choosing the winning horses
to some extent. We also note that there remain win-
ning horses in the right. This means that we can find
winning horses with very small win bet fractions.
3 Emergence of scale invariance
In order to see the existence of a winning horse with
a very small win bet ration or very low rank, we cal-
culate the cumulative functions of the winning horses
and that of the losing horses counted from the lowest
rank (right). More precisely, we study the following
quantities.
xµ(s) =
1
Nµ
N∑
α=N(1−s)
δIα,µ , µ ∈ {0, 1} (8)
The above are normalized so that xµ(s) is zero at s = 0
and 1 at s = 1. The curve (x0(s), x1(s)) is known as a
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. We are
interested in the limit s → 0. In particular, we study
the scale invariant relation x1 ∝ x
α
0 . If such a power
law relation holds, we can find winning horses with any
small win bet fraction.
Figure 3a shows the double logarithmic plot of the
ROC curves (x0(s), x1(s)). We show five curves for
t = ti, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. At t = t0, there are 70 votes
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Figure 3: (a) Double-logarithmic plot of the ROC
curve (x0, x1). We plot four ROC curves for t = ti, i ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The fitted lines with x1 = a·x
α
0 for t0 and
t3 are also plotted. (b) Double-logarithmic plot of the
ROC curve (x0, x1) for the data of all 1986-2006 JRA
races. We also show the fitted line with x1 = a · x
α
0 .
in the pool on average. The plot is almost a diagonal
line from (0, 0) to (1, 1), which means that the winning
and losing horses are mixed well in the sequence. The
curve is fitted with the power relation x1 = a · x
α
0 with
α = 1.03. As the betting progresses, the curve becomes
more downward convex shape and the slope increases.
At t = t3, t4, the degree of the phase separation be-
tween the two types of horses reaches its maximum.
On the other hand, we also see that there exist win-
ning horses in the very low rank region. Each step
upwards of the curve implies the existence of a win-
ning horse and the upward movement starts for a very
small x0. In addition, we also see a straight line region
in the curve in 0.03 ≤ x0 ≤ 0.3. We have fitted the
curve as in the previous (t0) case and we get α = 1.77.
This means that the scale invariant relation between
x1 and x0 also holds after many rounds of betting.
In order to see scale invariance more clearly, we show
the same plot for the data of all JRA races from 1986
to 2006 in Figure 3b [6]. There are 71549 races and
N1 = 71650 and N0 = 829716. The plot becomes
straight in 0.003 ≤ x0 ≤ 0.3 with α = 1.81.
4 Emergence of efficiency
The win bet fraction aggregates the wisdom of the bet-
ters in the racetrack betting market. In order to quan-
tify the accuracy, we use two measures. The first one
is the accuracy ratio (AR). AR measures how an event
occurs in the order of a rank. Here, we consider the
event that a horse wins in the race. Horses are arranged
in the increasing order of the size of the win bet frac-
tion xα, α ∈ {1, 2, · · ·N}. There are N1 winning horses
and N0 = N −N1 losing horses. As we have explained
before, if the prediction of the betters is good, the win-
ning horses are concentrated in the higher ranks. If the
prediction is perfect, the first N1 horses are the win-
ning ones and Iα is one for them. In order to define the
accuracy of the prediction or to measure the complete-
ness of the rank, we introduce a Lorenz curve (x,L(x))
for 0 ≤ x,L(x) ≤ 1 as
L(x) ≡
1
N1
N ·x∑
α=1
δIα,1. (9)
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Figure 4: Plot of (x,L(x)) (a) and (x,EL(x)) (b) for
t = ti, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Figure 4a depicts the Lorenz curves for t = tj , j ∈
0, 1, 2, 3, 4. At t = t0, after about seventy rounds,
the horses are arranged at random on the sequence
α ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. The Lorenz curve runs almost along
a diagonal line. As the betting proceeds, the winning
horses (Iα = 1) move to the higher ranks and the de-
gree of the upward convex nature of the curve increases.
The preciseness of the prediction increases monotoni-
cally. At t = t2, the increase almost stops and the
accuracy of the predictions reaches a maximum.
In order to quantify the accuracy of the predictions
of the racetrack betters, we use accuracy ratio, AR [12].
AR is defined as
AR ≡ (
∫ 1
0
L(x)dx −
1
2
)/
1
2
(1 −
N1
N
). (10)
AR measures how different is the ranking from the
complete case. The denominator in the definition is
the normalization factor that ensures that AR is one
for the completely ordered case. If the ranking is per-
fect,
∫ 1
0 L(x)dx −
1
2 =
1
2 (1−
N1
N
) and AR is 1.
We also introduce an expected Lorenz curve
(x,EL(x)), which is defined as
EL(x) ≡
1
R
N ·x∑
α=1
xα (11)
[9]. In order to quantify how the bets are concentrated
or scattered among horse, we introduce expected AR
and call it EAR. EAR is defined as
EAR ≡ (
∫ 1
0
EL(x)dx −
1
2
)/
1
2
(1−
R
N
). (12)
If we assume that the horses are divided into two
groups, A and B. The horses’ win bet fraction in group
A (xα, α ∈ A) is large and those of other horses in
group B (xβ , β ∈ B) is small, the votes are concen-
trated on the horses in group A. EAR is large. If the
votes are scattered among all horses, EAR is small. In
particular, if xα =
R
N
for all α ∈ N , EAR is zero. If
xα = 1, α ∈ A and xβ = 0, β ∈ B, EAR is one.
Figure 4b depicts EL(x) for t = tj , j ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
At t = t0, EL(x) rapidly increases to one, which im-
plies that votes are concentrated on small number of
horses. However, AR is small at t0 and the horses are
not the winning horses. After t0, the votes are scat-
tered among many horses and the degree of the upward
convex nature of the curve decreases up to t2. After
the decline, it begins to increases. At t4, the degree of
the concentration of votes reaches a maximum. t2 is
the boundary line. Before t2, votes are more and more
distributed among many horses. After t2, the votes
tend to be concentrated on popular horses.
By comparing the behaviour of L(x) and EL(x), we
are able to study the efficiency of the market. If the
probability that the horse α wins is xα, the two Lorenz
curves L(x) and EL(x) do coincide with each other in
the limit N → ∞. Hence the equality AR = EAR
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Figure 5: Plot of AR and EAR as the functions of t.
The plot starts at t0 and the two curves intersects at
t1 and t3. At t2, the discrepancy reaches its maximum
after t1.
is a necessary condition of the efficiency of the mar-
ket. However, it is not a sufficient condition. Even if
the equality holds, there is a possibility that the two
curves depart from each other. We also note that if the
strength of the horse at rank x is overvalued, the in-
equality L′(x) < EL′(x) holds. On the contrary if the
strength is undervalued, the inequality L′(x) > EL′(x)
holds. Here L′(x) = dL(x)
dx
and EL′(x) = dEL(x)
dx
.
Figure 5 shows AR and EAR as the functions of t.
As the betting progresses, AR increases monotonically
and it almost reaches its maximum at t = t2. After-
wards, the increase in AR is very slow and the following
bets do not increase the accuracy of the prediction as to
which horse wins the race. More interesting behaviour
can be found in the time change of EAR. At t = t0,
EAR is very large and is nearly 0.9. Almost all votes
are concentrated on small number of horses. However,
AR at t = t0 is small and the horses with large bet
fractions are not so strong. The true strong horses are
scattered all over the rank of the win bet fraction. Af-
terwords, EAR decreases rapidly and at t = t1, AR and
EAR coincide. The necessary condition of the market
efficiency is satisfied at t = t1. Up to t = t2, EAR
decreases and almost reaches its minimum. The bets
are scattered among many horses and this implies the
rich variety of the betters’ predictions as to which horse
wins the race. This also means that the strong horses
are undervalued and the weak horses are overvalued,
that is the ‘favorite-longshot bias’ state, which can be
seen more clearly below. The discrepancy between AR
and EAR is the largest at t = t2 after t = t1. After
that, the discrepancy decreases monotonically as EAR
increases faster than AR. The bets begin to be con-
centrated on more popular horses. At t = t3, AR and
EAR coincide again. The necessary condition of the
market efficiency is satisfied again. After t3, the degree
of the concentration increases further, the discrepancy
between AR and EAR is small even at t4.
Figure 6a shows the discrepancies between L(x) and
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Figure 6: (a) Plot of DL(x) ≡ L(x) − EL(x) for t =
ti, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. (b) Plot of DL(x) for t3 and all the
data of JRA races (1986− 2006). Inset figure show the
plot for all the data case for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1%.
EL(x) at t = ti, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. On the y-axis, we
show DL(x) ≡ L(x) − EL(x). As we have explained
before, the sign of DL′(x) = dDL(x)
dx
tells us whether
the horse at rank x is overestimated or underestimated.
If DL′(x) is zero, the strength of the horse is prop-
erly estimated by the betters and the racetrack bet-
ting market is efficient. On the other hand, if DL′(x)
is positive (negative), the strength is underestimated
(oversetimated).
At t = t1, DL(x) is close to the x-axis and we see
that for small x ≤ 20%, DL(x) < 0. This means that
the market is almost efficient, but top 10% popular
horses are overestimated and next 10% horses are un-
derestimated. Bets are more accumulated on the top
10% horses and their win bet fractions are larger than
their true winning probabilities. On the other hand,
there are less bets on next 10% horses as compared
to their true winning probabilities. Remaining 80%
horses’ strength are properly estimated, because DL(x)
is close to the x-axis. At t = t2, DL(x) is positive for
all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. From the figure, we see that the pop-
ular 30% horses are underestimated as compared to
their winning probabilities. Remaining 70% unpopu-
lar horses are overestimated. The bets are distributed
among many horses, including many weak horses and
an inefficient state is realized. Following this, the graph
of DL(x) approaches the x-axis at t = t3. The coinci-
dence between the two Lorenz curves is better than at
t = t1. For small x (popular horses), DL(x) < 0 and
the strong horses are overestimated. For large x (un-
popular horses), DL(x) is almost on the x-axis. From
the small discrepancy, we see that the top 20% horses
are overestimated. And next 30% horses are underesti-
mated. However, the slope of DL(x) in the two regions
is small and the market is almost efficient. This effi-
cient state remains to be true even at t3.
Figure 6b shows DL(x) for the data of all JRA races
(1986-2006). Contrary to the ‘favourite-longshot bias’,
we see some complex behaviour. Top 0.4% horses are
underestimated and next 10% horses are overestimated
and so on. However, the degree of the inefficiency is
very small.
5 Voting model and scale invari-
ance
We consider a voting model for N horses [6]. Bet-
ters vote for them one by one, and the result of each
voting is announced promptly. The time variable
t ∈ {0, 1, 2 · · · , T } counts the number of the votes. The
horses are classified into two categories µ ∈ {0, 1}, and
we call them binary horses. There are Nµ horses in
each category and N0 +N1 = N .
We denote the number of votes of the ith horse µ ∈
{0, 1} at time t as {Xµi,t}i∈{1,···,Nµ}. At t = 0,X
µ
i,t takes
the initial value Xµi,0 = sµ > 0. If the ith candidate µ
gets a vote at t, Xµi,t increases by one unit.
Xµi,t+1 = X
µ
i,t + 1.
A better casts a vote for the N candidates at a rate
proportional to Xµi,t. The probability P
µ
i,t that the ith
candidate µ gets a vote at t is
Pµi,t =
Xµi,t
Zt
, (13)
Zt =
1∑
µ=0
Nµ∑
i=1
Xµi,t = N1s1 +N0s0 + t. (14)
The problem of determining the probability of the
ith candidate µ getting n votes up to T is equivalent
to the famous Po´lya’s urn problem [10, 11]. The prob-
ability that the ith candidate µ gets n votes up to T is
given by the beta binomial distribution
Prob(Xµi,T−sµ = n) = TCn·
(sµ)n(Z0 − sµ)T−n
(Z0)T
. (15)
(a)n is defined as (a)n =
Γ(a+n)
Γ(a) .
After infinite counts of voting, i.e. T → ∞, the
share of votes xµi ≡ limT→∞
X
µ
i,T
−sµ
T
becomes the beta
distributed random variable beta(sµ, Z0− sµ) on [0, 1].
p(x) ≡ lim
T→∞
Prob(Xµi,T − sµ = Tx) · T
=
xsµ−1(1− x)Z0−sµ−1
B(sµ, Z0 − sµ)
. (16)
Next, we focus on the thermodynamic limit
N0, N1 →∞ and Z0 = N0s0+N1s1 →∞. The expec-
tation value of xµi is < x
µ
i >= pµ =
sµ
Z0
. We introduce
a variable uµi ≡ (Z0 − sµ − 1)x
µ
i . The distribution
function psµ(u) in the thermodynamic limit is given as
psµ(u) ≡ lim
Z0→∞
p(xµi =
u
Z0 − sµ − 1
) =
1
Γ(sµ)
e−uusµ−1.
(17)
The share of votes, u, of a candidate µ follows a gamma
distribution function with sµ.
After many counts of voting, T →∞, the two types
of horses are distributed in the space of u according
to the gamma distribution in the thermodynamic limit
Z0 →∞. If s1 > s0, a candidate belonging to category
µ = 1 has a higher probability of getting many votes
than a candidate belonging to category µ = 0. Even
the latter can obtain many votes. It is also possible
that the former may get few votes. Thus, there is a
mixing of the binary candidates.
The cumulative functions xµ(w) is given as
xµ(w) =
∫ w
0
psµ(u)du. (18)
Using the incomplete gamma function of the first kind
γ(s, w) ≡
∫ w
0 e
−u · us−1du, it is given as
xµ(w) =
1
Γ(sµ)
· γ(sµ, w). (19)
Near the end point, w → 0, in other words, in the
small u region, the incomplete gamma function γ(sµ, t)
behaves as
γ(sµ, w) ∼ w
sµ . (20)
As xsµ(w) ∝ w
sµ , the following relation holds:
x1 ∼ x
α
0 with α =
s1
s0
. (21)
We see that a scale invariant behaviour appears in the
mixing.
Furthermore, in the limit (s1, s0)→ (0, 0) with fixed
α = s1/s0, next relation holds [6].
x1 = x
α
0 (22)
The scale-invariant relation holds over the entire range
0 ≤ x0, x1 ≤ 1. This feature is remarkable from the
viewpoint of statistical physics. Usually, the power-
law relation holds only in the tail.
Figure 7: Exact scale invariant gradation pattern with
varying α from α = 1 (bottom) to α = 100 (top).
We discuss the limit in the derivation of the ex-
act scale invariance. In the derivation of the gamma
distribution, we take the thermodynamic limit Z0 =
N1s1 + N0s0 → ∞. With the gamma distribution,
x1 = x
α
0 holds in the limit {sµ} → 0. For (22) to
hold, these two limits, Z0 → ∞ and {sµ} → 0, should
go together. {sµ} approaches zero more slowly than
{Nµ} approaches infinity. We call the limit Z0 → ∞
and {sµ} → 0 with fixed α = s1/s0 as the double scal-
ing limit. If we take the limit {sµ} → 0 without the
limit Z0 →∞, the firstly chosen candidate gets all the
remaining votes and there is no mixing of the binary
candidates. The double scaling limit is crucial to the
emergence of the exact scale invariance.
6 Exact scale invariant grada-
tion pattern
The voting problem reduces to a random ball removing
problem with the relative probability sµ in the double
scaling limit [6]. Figure 11 shows the gradation pattern
made by the algorithm of the random ball removing
problem. We prepare N1 red balls and N0 blue balls.
From them, we take one ball at a time and do not re-
turn it. The probability that a red (blue) ball is chosen
is proportional to s1(s0). We repeat the procedure up
to when there remains no ball. We get a sequence of
N = N1 + N0 balls. In the limit N1, N0 → ∞, the
exact scale invariance between x1 and x0 holds. In the
figure, we change the ratio α = s1
s0
from 1 (bottom)
to 100 (top). Near the bottom, two types of balls are
mixed. Near the top, phase separation occurs.
7 Summary
In this paper, we study the time series of win bet frac-
tion of the 2008 JRA races. We see that the betting
process induces scale invariance between the cumula-
tive functions of the winning horses and that of the
losing horses. We also see the emergence of the mar-
ket’s efficiency after many rounds of betting. However,
the convergence to the efficient state is not monotonic.
The dynamics of the distribution of the votes among
the horses is complex. At first, the votes accumulate to
small number of horses and then they are distributed
among many horses, including weak horses. At this
time, the strong horses are underestimated. After-
wards, votes begin to be concentrated on more popular
horses, but the ranking of the winning horses does not
change so much. AR does not change much and only
EAR increases, and AR = EAR finally holds.
With regard to the scale invariance, we explain the
mechanism based on a simple voting model. The model
shows exact scale invariance in the double scaling limit.
In addition, the voting model in the limit is equivalent
to a random ball removing problem. Using the equiva-
lence, we show how to make an exact gradation pattern
of mixed binary objects.
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